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Moreover, one justice was doubtful that so large an estate could
have been properly settled in any case without an administration.
In opposition to the final account of the administatrix of
the estate of deceased, in Succession of Siren,3 his daughter by
a previous marriage, the curatrix of his interdicted widow, main-
tained that a debt was owed. The deceased had bought and
mortgaged certain property preceding his second marriage and
this indebtedness had been paid during the second community.
The court held that the community owed the separate estate this
amount and the widow should receive a credit of one-half of it.
The lower court had recognized the widow as a creditor to be
paid from the mass of the estate, which would have reduced the
share of the community due to the widow.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
There was presented to the court in Amato v. Latter & Blum,
Inc.' the novel question of whether a real estate agent who with-
holds from the owner of listed property an offer to buy it and
thereby induces him to sell at a lower figure to another buyer
violates a legal duty owed to the prospective purchaser. The lat-
ter brought suit for damages based on the difference between
the offer submitted and the price put on the property by the
party who bought it. The trial court upheld an exception of no
cause of action and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court
reversed. It found that the broker owed the prospective pur-
chaser a duty to communicate the offer'to the owner. This was
based on the proposition that R.S. 37:1432-54 regulating the
business of real estate brokerage and requiring real estate
brokers to give a bond, constitute a legislative recognition that
real estate brokerage is a business affected with a public inter-
est. Justice Hamiter dissented, finding no basis in the legislation
for the existence of a duty in the agent to the prospective pur-
chaser.2 Beyond the question of statutory construction it is in-
teresting to speculate whether relief might have been granted'on
33. 226 La. 687, 77 So.2d 5 (1954).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 227 La. 537. 79 So.2d 873 (1955).
2. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Note, 16 LoUtsrANA LAw RE-
vrsw 447 (1956).
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the theory that the broker had injured the plaintiff by causing
him to rely on the belief that his offer would be presented to the
owner. Does a real estate broker, by receiving an offer for listed
property, impliedly promise to present it to the owner? Would
such a promise have a lawful cause? Should it be said that the
broker had reason to believe that if he refused to receive the offer
the plaintiff would go directly to the owner?
On the basis of a careful analysis of the facts, the court, in
Louisiana State Board of Education v. Lindsay,3 failed to find
an offer and acceptance resulting from negotiations between the
Board of Education and a landowner looking toward the pur-
chase by the former of a tract of land. It adverted to the rule
that an oral acceptance is ineffective and to the provisions of
article 1805 of the Civil Code under which an acceptance must
conform with the terms of the offer. The case should serve as a
reminder to prospective purchasers of real estate that careless
and indefinite dealings create particular risks in cases of this
kind. The court was specific in commenting that not only must
an offer to buy or sell immovable property be in writing but that
the acceptance must also be in writing. This positive expression
of the court may assist in cutting off the dubious roots of an
earlier opinion which seemed to find an acceptance in the pur-
chaser's recordation of an offer to sell real estate.
4
Another problem of offer and acceptance was before the
court in Mackey v. Scarborough.5 It was found that the plain-
tiff, suing to enforce an alleged contract to convey land by way
of a compromise, had failed to accept the offer made prior to the
offeror's death.
Generally speaking, contracting parties are free to close their
contract when it suits them to do so. They may, for example,
verbally agree on all the terms of a proposed contract with the
understanding that they will not be bound until a writing em-
bodying their agreement is signed. On the other hand, they may
enter into a verbal contract with the understanding that they
are then bound but with the further understanding that they
will later reduce the contract to writing for purposes of evidence
and to avoid future dispute. If then the contemplated writing is
3. 227 La. 553, 79 So.2d 879 (1955).
4. See Cerami v. Haas, 195 La. 1048, 197 So. 752 (1940) ; cf. Haas v. Cerami,
201 La. 612, 10 So.2d 61 (1942).
5. 226 La. 106, 75 So.2d 24 (1954).
[Vol. XVI
1956] CIVIL CODE AND RELATED SUBJECTS 239
viewed by them merely as a memorial of their verbal contract,
the fact that they fail to have it drawn up and signed will have
no effect. When they do not intend to be bound until the writing
is signed, a failure to reduce the agreement to writing will pre-
vent the formation of a contract. This latter rule was applied,
properly it appears, in the case of Breaux Brothers Construction
Co. v. Associated Contractors, Inc.6 However, the court in so rul-
ing quoted from an earlier case7 indicating that it is only when
the agreement to reduce to writing is made subsequent to the
verbal contract that the failure to execute the writing will have
no effect. This is believed to be too narrow a statement of the
principle. Even when the agreement to reduce to writing is part
and parcel of the whole understanding it need not prevent the
formation of a complete verbal contract unless the parties so
intend. To get at this intention the whole facts may be consid-
ered, not merely the point of time when the agreement to reduce
to writing is made.
The case of Dane & Northrop v. Rittiner8 presented the ques-
tion of whether the payment of a specified sum constituted the
final act necessary to the acceptance of an offer covering the
financing of a housing project, or whether the written proposal
of the plaintiff to which the defendant affixed his signature by
way of acceptance constituted a completed contract and resulted
in the imposition of a duty on the defendant to make the stipu-
lated payment. The court took the former view. Justice Mc-
Caleb, in dissenting, took the latter. The stated sum was not paid
and the suit was to recover it. The written proposal was un-
doubtedly susceptible of the construction placed upon it by the
majority of the court, but at the same time it might have lent
itself as readily to the contrary construction. Although approval
of any loans under the commitment was clearly conditioned on
the deposit of the specified sum in cash, the written proposal of-
fering the commitment might well have been held subject to
merely the defendant's signature of acceptance. The defendant
offered parol evidence to show that the written acceptance was
conditioned on the defendant's securing necessary interim fi-
nancing. There is a possibility the court may have been satisfied
of this but it was found unnecessary to pass on the admissibility
6. 226 La. 720, 77 So.2d 17 (1954).
7. Fredericks v. Fasnacht, 30 La. Ann. 117 (1878).
8. 226 La. 1074, 78 So.2d 178 (1955).
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of the proffered evidence in view of the holding that the deposit
was necessary to complete the acceptance. In passing, it may be
observed that parol evidence that a writing purporting to con-
tain the terms of a contract was delivered or signed condition-
ally should always be admissible. There is no need to exclude
such evidence until it has been determined that a contract has
been made. A written document cannot prove its own character.9
In Smith v. LeSueur & Co.10 the court reaffirmed its position
that misrepresentation concerning the rentals that may be col-
lected legally on property offered for sale for investment pur-
poses will justify a judgment annulling a contract for the pur-
chase of the property.
A contract for the installation of a heating system was dis-
solved in Ilgenfritz v. Radalec, Inc." and the owner was given
judgment for the amounts paid plus the cost of removing the
system and restoring his home to its former condition. The court
approved the trial court's finding that the non-performance was
complete and entire. This case should make it clear that where
there is a total failure of performance and not a partial default
only, the owner is not restricted to a reduction in the price in an
amount required to correct the defects.
-1 2
In Roland v. American Casualty Co.13 the court applied the
rule that when a contractor is prevented by the owner from ful-
filling his contract he is entitled to the profit he would have
made. This is determined by deducting from the contract price
what it would have cost the contractor to complete the work. The
result is to put the contractor in as good a position as he would
have been in if the contract had been carried out as originally
contemplated.
In Walker v. Iannazzo'4 the plaintiff was suing on an alleged
agreement under which he was to receive $75 per week plus one-
third of the net profit on the sale of two buildings, the construc-
tion of which plaintiff was to supervise. The $75 per week hav-
ing been paid, plaintiff was claiming the one-third of the net
profit. He claimed this supposedly on the basis of the alleged
9. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 577, especially illustration (6) (1951).
10. 227 La. 413, 79 So.2d 501 (1955).
11. 226 La. 59, 74 So.2d 903 (1954).
12. Of. Mangin v. Jorgens, 24 So.2d 38 (La. App. 1946).
13. 227 La. 727, 80 So.2d 387 (1955).
14. 226 La. 856, 77 So.2d 513 (1955).
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agreement, and in the alternative he asked recovery of the sum
in quantum meruit. The court rejected his claim founded on the
agreement for lack of evidence and also rejected his alternative
claim for recovery in quantum meruit for lack of proof. If a con-
tractor has completed his performance he is entitled to recover
the agreed compensation, or if he is unable to prove that a com-
pensation was agreed upon, he is entitled to recover, as by way
of restitution, the value of his services. Perhaps, where after
performance the defendant breaks his contract to pay, the plain-
tiff might get a judgment either for the contract price or the
value of the services rendered, 15 but it is doubtful that where a
plaintiff's services have created a contractual money debt a court
would create a non-contractual money debt in a different amount.
At any rate, the proof must support the claim and here it did not.
In Sheeks v. McCain-Richards, Inc.'6 the court was con-
fronted with a complicated problem involving an award of dam-
ages for breach of contract and the establishment of certain
claims of the defendant by way of compensation or set-off for
sums paid or advanced to the defendant. A comment by the court
that a novation occurred through the giving of a note to cover
an existing indebtedness and an additional advance is open to
question.' 7 However, no holding on the point appears to have
been necessary. Otherwise the opinion raises no issue.
A case clearly calling for the application of the principle that
where a party prevents the fulfillment of a condition on which
he is to be bound the condition will be considered as fulfilled was
Garig Transfer, Inc. v. Harris.' This principle is found in ar-
ticle 2040 of the Civil Code. The language of the article is con-
fused but this comes from its poor translation from the French.
The court's recognition of the true meaning of the provisions
was clear and succinct. So, too, was its discussion of the right
to recover for profits lost. Exact proof should not be required
but at the same time an award cannot be based on mere specula-
tion. Nonsuiting the claim for damages was a fair disposition
of it.
15. See 5 COBBIN, CONTRACTS § 1110 (1951).
16. 226 La. 578, 76 So.2d 892 (1954).
17. See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Thomson, 186 La: 1, 171 So. 55.3
(1936); Lee Tire & Rubber Co. v. Frederick-Planehe Motor Co., 180 So. 143
(La. App. 1938).
18. 226 La. 117, 75 So.2d 28 (1954).
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Article 2239 of the Civil Code permits forced heirs to intro-
duce parol evidence in an effort to annul as simulated the con-
tracts of those from whom they inherit. In Miller v. Miller19 the
court rejected as inadmissible hearsay an affidavit of the an-
cestor to the effect that a mortgage granted to his second wife's
brother to secure an advance of $5000 was simulated. It pointed
out that article 2239 does not permit the substitution of hearsay
as legal proof.
In Vath v. Gay20 the court applied Civil Code article 2277, re-
quiring proof by at least one credible witness and other cor-
roborating circumstances of a contract for the payment of
money in excess of $500, and affirmed the lower court's judg-
ment rejecting both the principal and reconventional demands
for lack of sufficient evidence.
A problem of contract interpretation was presented to the
court in Pothier v. Barber Laboratories, Inc.21 The opinion was
well and convincingly reasoned and in accordance with article




In the case of Lake v. Lejeune,' the Supreme Court applied
the rule that authority to an agent to sell real estate must be
specific and in writing and concluded that an attorney at law, as
such, has no authority to contract for the sale of his client's real
estate. The case also involved a holding that where the parties
to an agreement for the sale of property stipulate that the Tprice
shall be fixed by experts to be appointed by them, either has it
in his power to prevent the perfection of the sale by refusing to
make the appointment. No mention was made of the possibility
of recovering damages based on the failure to appoint. In an
earlier and factually weaker case, the right of the plaintiff to
sue for damages was reserved.2 The opinion in the instant case
19. 226 La. 273, 76 So.2d 3 (1954).
20. 226 La. 873, 77 So.2d 519 (1955).
21. 227 La. 357, 79 So.2d 481 (1955).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 226 La. 48, 74 So.2d 899 (1954).
2. Louis Werner Sawmill Co. v. O'Shee, 111 La. 817, 35 So. 919 (1904).
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